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Judicial Responsibility and Moral Values
By Lois G. FoPRE*
d MERICAN JUDGES in the last quarter of the twentieth
century have faced perhaps the most extraordinary and be-
wildering array of problems demanding decision that has
been presented to any group of people in recorded history. The ques-
tions posed to fallible men and women who claim no supernatural
wisdom or divine guidance have included such issues as the right to
die,' limitations on liability for nuclear explosions, 2 the right of citi-
zens to know what their public officials say and do,3 the obligation
of individuals to breach confidences," the responsibility of manufac-
turers to persons unknown to them,5 the duty to protect plant and
animal life,6 the right of the public to control scientific experimenta-
tion,7 the right of the citizen to obtain psychiatric care," and to be
* Judge, Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. A.B., Northwestern
University, 1935; J.D., Northwestern University, 1938. Author, "No One Will Lissen":
How Our Legal System Brutalizes the Youthful Poor (1970); The Death of the Law
(1975).
1. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
2. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 431 F. Supp. 203 (W.D.N.C. 1977), appeal docketed, No. C-C-73-139 (4th
Cir. Mar. 31, 1977).
3. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 et. seq. (1967); Department of
the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1975); NLRB v. Sears, 421 U.S. 132 (1975).
4. Branzburg v. Hayes Newspaper Reporter, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
5. RF-STATEmENT (SEcobID) OF TORTS § 402a (1967); Garthwait v. Burgio, 153
Conn. 284, 216 A.2d 189 (1965); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210
N.E.2d 182 (1965); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing and Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434,
212 A.2d 769 (1965); Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
6. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727 (1972).
7. See, e.g., New York Senate Bill to Require State Health Commissioner to Es-
tablish Regulations for Recombinant DNA Research, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1977, at
B6, col. 3; see also N.Y. Times, June 20, 1977, N.J., at 23, col. 5.
8. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Rouse v. Cameron, 373
F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
E 1641]
free from noise, pollution, and unsightliness,9 and the obligation of
society to redress historic wrongs by granting contemporary advan-
tages. 10 American judges, moreover, are still faced with the age old
problems of guilt or innocence, the determination of appropriate pen-
alties, problems of personal and property rights, and the fashioning
of remedies for the invasion of such rights.
The United States among nations has the greatest number of
laws, lawyers, and judges, the greatest quantum of litigation," and
the highest rate of crime. The behavior of people in a free demo-
cratic nation cannot be meaningfully compared with that of people
living under dictatorships where violations of law are frequently
punishable by death or imprisonment without trial or without even
the rudiments of due process. Nonetheless, crime statistics in the
United States are dismaying.12  The number of police officers," 3 the
prison rolls, 14 and the quantity of resources allocated to law enforce-
ment' 5 continue to escalate.
The classic American rationale for obedience to law is the mythic
concept, "the rule of law.""; This rationale has proved to be inade-
9. British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., 562 F.2d 37 (2d Cir.
1977).
10. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978); DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
11. See N.Y. Times Nov. 16, 1977, at A28, col. 1, quoting Hale Champion, Under
Secretary, HEW. "There is more surgery in the United States today than there ought
to be . . . there are many thousands more surgeons than we need . . . excess surgeons
lead to excess surgery .... ." There are more than 100,000 students in law school today.
Recent law graduates are finding increasing difficulty in obtaining employment. One
might conclude that excess lawyers leads to excess litigation.
12. It is estimated that in 1976 there were 11,304,800 incidents of crime in the
United States. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 35 (1977).
13. In 1961, the total number of policemen employed nationally was 189,093.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1956-65, at 108 (1962). In 1969,
the number had risen to 254,984. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS
1969-71, at 148 (1972).
14. Approximately 250,000 persons as of this writing are in custody in the United
States. In 1970, there were 196,429 in prison; in 1955, there were 185,780 in prison.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF Comm., HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED
STATES, COLONIAL TIMEs-1970, at 420 (1971).
15. National public expenditures on police protection activities were: in 1954-
$2,080,000,000; in 1960-$3,349,000,000; in 1970-$8,571,000,000. Id. at 416.
16. The debate over natural law and positive law is beyond the scope of this
Article. See J. HALL, FOUNDATIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1973).
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quate; the concept of the "rule of law" has not engendered a strong col-
lective morality dedicated to lawful conduct. The author, as a trial
judge, has observed that persons convicted of crime 17 frequently lack
a sense of wrongdoing, contrition, or sin. 18  Indeed, there are those
engaged in the administration of the criminal justice system who have
apparently repudiated the concept of sin.19
There is little consensus as to what is right and what is wrong,
what is justifiable and what is reprehensible. What is evident is a
widespread dissatisfaction with the law and the administration of
justice.20 Certainly the disparities in sentencing, the often arbitrary
prosecution of the accused persons, and rapid fluctuations in the law,
as well as a sense of anomie, are, in part, responsible for this attitude.
In addition, the public is seriously divided by such social issues as
abortion, busing, and pornography. There is little agreement on
17. This experience includes presiding over more than fifty homicide trials, sev-
eral hundred felony trials, countless misdemeanor cases, and representation as attorney
of more than 3,000 clients accused of crime. Of course, many of these defendants
claimed to be innocent. Many, however, admitted committing the acts of which they
were accused. These defendants included powerful politicians, wealthy and indigent
adults and children.
18. See K. MENIcaGE, WHATEVER BECAME OF SIN? 220-21, 228 (1973). Note
that Karl Menninger, the eminent psychiatrist, concludes this book with a plea to the
clergy. See also LEwis, GOD IN HE DocK, EssAYs ON THEOLOGY AND ETHics (1970).
19. See VON HmscH, DoING JusTicE: THE CHOICE OF PUmssmIENTS, REPORT OF
THE Coamrrra FOR THE STUDy OF INCARCERATION (1976). The committee was com-
posed of Charles E. Goodell, former United States Senator; Marshall Cohen, Professor
of Philosophy; Samuel Dubois Cook, President of Dilliard University; Alan M. Dersho-
witz, Prof. Harvard Law School; Dr. Willard Gaylin, psychoanalyst; Prof. Erving Goff-
man, Univ. of Pa.; Prof. Joseph Goldstein, Yale Law School; Jorge Lara-Braud, Exec.
Dir. Comm. on Faith and Order; Victor Marrero, First Ass't Counsel to Gov. of N.Y.;
Eleanor Holmes Norton, N.Y. City Comm'n on Human Rights; Prof. David J. Rothman,
Columbia Univ.; Prof. Simon Rottenberg, Univ. of Mass.; Prof. Herman Schwartz,
State Univ. of N.Y.; Prof. Stanton Wheeler, Yale Law School; Prof. Leslie T. Wilkins,
State Univ. of N.Y. The Report attempts to establish a rationale for the imposition
of penalties for violation of criminal laws, phrased as imposing "Just Deserts in an
Unjust Society." Professor Wilkins complains, "It seems that we have rediscovered 'sin'
in the absence of a better alternativel" Id. at 178. The Committee, so far from re-
discovering sin, concludes that "someone who is responsible for wrongdoing is blame-
worthy and hence may justly be blamed." Id. at 49.
20. Note the statement of Justice Stevens writing for a unanimous court in deny-
ing social security benefits to a disabled person suffering from cerebral palsy, that
"rules produce seemingly arbitrary consequences in some individual cases." Califano
v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
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such fundamental questions as the propriety of lying,21 stealing,22 and
killing. 23
A concerted effort by all segments of the legal system is required
to make the laws and the manner of their implementation2 4 fairer
for all citizens. The judiciary has special obligations to make the
administration of law honest, credible, and responsible. 23
The author proposes certain limited steps that the judiciary could
take to restore confidence in the litigation process. Justice must not
only be done; it must be seen to be done. Except for police officers,
judges are the most visible constituents of the justice system. Judges
21. Richard Helms, former Director of CIA, was convicted of lying to a United
States Senate Committee and was sternly rebuked by the judge. Helms declared, "I
don't feel disgraced at all" and declared that the conviction was a badge of honor.
Helms was acclaimed by CIA employees. N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1977, at 1, col. 2.
22. Compare the varying reactions to the widespread looting during the blackout
in New York in July, 1977. Some persons referred to looters as "scum and animals";
others such as Prof. Gutman and the N.Y. Times looked upon it as an inarticulate cry
for social justice. More than 3,700 people were arrested and 418 police were injured.
N.Y. Times, July 17, 1977, § 4, at 1, col. 6.
23. See the wide divergence of opinion with respect to the conviction and guilt
of Lt. William L. Calley, Jr., N.Y. Times, June 25, 1974, at 8, col. 3; id., April 26,
1974, at 36, col. 7; id., March 4, 1974, at 28, col. 1.
24. It is unnecessary to point out the disadvantages faced by the poor in obtaining
legal counsel and access to the courts. One must recognize that while the landmark
decisions in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and In re Gault, 387 U.S. I
(1968), have provided defendants with a warm body with a legal degree, the decisions
have by no means equalized the standing of the poor defendant in court. The denial
of access to the courts to the poor continues with the approval of the United States
Supreme Court. See, e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (holding that in-
digents have no right to file a petition in bankruptcy without paying a filing fee);
Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (upholding requirement of a twenty-five
dollar filing fee to appeal a reduction in welfare payments).
25. Discontent is voiced by members of the clergy and the legal profession. Or-
ganized religion is troubled by the disobedience of its adherents. Catholics openly
flout the teachings of the church on such issues as birth control, abortion, divorce, and
discontinuance of Latin in the liturgy. Protestants have defied church rulings with
respect to ordination of women. Every sect and denomination faces refusal of sizable
numbers to obey authority. Members of the clergy are going to law school in increasing
numbers. And lawyers are going to divinity schools. Each profession recognizes its
own weakness in bringing about a more just social order and turns to the other with
misguided hope. As Professor Harold Berman points out, the problem is how religion
today can "command sufficient authority to carry forward into a new age the great
principles of Western jurisprudence." BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RE-
LICION 72 (1974). See the obverse of the problem as stated by this author. FORER,
THE DEATH OF THE LAW (1975). Neither law nor religion will accomplish its aims
merely by an exchange of personnel. Both must find a more rational and acceptable
basis for commanding obedience than mere reliance on authority.
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act in courtrooms open to the public and the press. They are not
anonymous bureaucrats but public officials who are invested with
enormous powers and responsibilities. Their actions, when perceived
to be arbitrary, short-sighted, or venal, contribute to public disre-
spect for law.
Decision-making power was not always vested in a class of civil
functionaries known as the judiciary. In earlier times, people sought
answers to individual and social problems from religious leaders. De-
pending upon the society, the religious authority was a seer, medicine-
man, shaman, oracle, priest, or clergyman. For centuries both the
power to judge, that is, to assess blame and impose punishment, and
the power to heal were presumed to require divine or supernatural
powers. In time, the practice of medicine became a secular art, as
did the judicial function.
In societies that had or have a state religion, the dichotomy be-
tween religious or moral decisions and civil or governmental deci-
sions is still not clearly defined. The law may embody the teaching
of the established faith. In fundamentally secular America, how-
ever, individuals faced with difficult personal decisions frequently
solicit the counsel and support of both organized religion and the
state. For example, the parents of Siamese twins, before going to
court for an order to permit surgical severance of the children,
surgery which would result in the death of one, obtained religious
sanction.26 In the same spirit, many persons seek both a civil and
a church sanctioned divorce.
Even in a pluralistic society, however, the ties between church
and state may be extremely close. In America the clergy are com-
missioned as officers to serve as chaplains in the armed forces.
Clergy are also hired by civil authorities to work in prisons. In both
circumstances the clergy may have to counsel men concerning the
civilly sanctioned taking of human life.
The clergy and the judiciary have strikingly different approaches
to problem solving. Traditionally the priest consults divine or super-
natural authority. For Roman priests the answers were revealed in
the entrails of dead birds. For seers and prophets revelation was
found in trance-like seances which usually took place in the desert
or the mountains. Contemporary religious leaders may consult scrip-
tures or seek revelation through prayer. Whether it is believed that
the scriptures were written or revealed by the divinity or by an in-
26. Philadelphia Inquirer, Oct. 16, 1977, at 1A.
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spired holy person, they have an imprimatur of more than human
wisdom. The priest's power is based on divine will.
Judges possess no such attributes. They do not claim special
virtues or the capacity of divine insight or authority. The judge's
power is derived from the state pursuant to wholly secular documents
such as constitutions, and he or she must depend upon individual
scholarship and temperament as a source of insight. Constitutions,
statutes, decisions, and other authorities upon which the judiciary re-
lies under the rubric of stare decisis are thought to flow from human
wisdom, not divine authority.
Unlike the role of the priest, under our adversary system of liti-
gation, judges are not conciliators or arbitrators. Judges have very
limited choices. Most decisions displease at least one party. In
controversial cases in which strong views are held, widespread pub-
lic dissatisfaction and dismay may arise as the result of an unpopular
decision.
What force do judges implicitly rely upon when it is essential
to compel Americans to abide by decisions which violate their sense
of justice or morality? The disputes of anthropologists over whether
primitive society is regulated by law or custom provide some insight. 27
As a general postulate, customs evidencing reciprocal obligations and
benefits did generally induce voluntary compliance with communal
standards of behavior in primitive societies. There were, however,
individuals who for strong personal reasons, impulse, or simply lack
of self control violated well understood taboos. Proscribed behavior
in primitive societies was predicated not upon enacted laws or deci-
sions issued by an authority figure but upon a consensus as to what
amounted to illicit behavior and widespead acceptance of specified
punishment for certain transgressions. Such a behavioral consensus
does not exist in American society today, and, therefore. judicial de-
cisions often do not receive widespread acceptance.
It is necessary to examine the behavior, the obligations, and the
limitations of the American judiciary to determine the manner in
which judges by their actions might promote respect for court de-
cisions and for legal institutions generally. There are approximately
20,000 judges in the United States. 28  Perhaps half of them are lay
27. See MIALINOWSKY, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY (1932); Radcliffe-
Brown, Primitive Law, 9-10 SELIGMAN & JOHNSON, ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 202 (1949).
28. There are no comprehensive statistics. However, as of 1971 there were 17,057
state and local courts. Many of these have more than one judge. Each of the fifty
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magistrates or have a very limited jurisdiction. There are 660 fed-
eral judges and approximately 10,000 state judges of courts of record.
Federal judges are appointed for life. Most state judges are either
elected or appointed for life or for long terms of office. Judges may
render decisions that violate the law, are venal, unfair, capricious or
brutal. Unless, however, a judge is found taking money from the
underworld or committing sodomy in a public place, there is little
likelihood that he or she will be removed from office.
An ordinary criminal conviction does not necessarily occasion re-
moval from the bench. Many state and local judges have been con-
victed of crimes. Many more have been investigated for behavior
that offends fundamental standards of propriety and decency. Few
have been impeached. 29  It is noted that the foregoing convictions
were not for breach of standards of judicial conduct but for common
crimes. The judges were tried like any other accused person and had
the benefit of the presumption of innocence, the privilege against
self-incrimination, and the requirement of proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. The fact that some accused judges were not con-
victed is hardly a testimonial to fitness to serve on the bench. There
is a great need to define what conduct short of a crime will subject
a judge to discipline and removal.
There are several reasons for the judiciary's failure until recently
to address the issue of professional ethics and responsibility. Be-
cause the judiciary is an independent branch of the government,
there are constitutional impediments to imposition of standards of
conduct or behavior on the judiciary by the legislature or the ex-
ecutive. 30  The judiciary is not, of course, precluded from setting
standards for its own members. 3'
states has a court of last resort of from five to nine members, one or more intermediate
appellate courts composed of several members, and numerous trial courts of record
that are usually created by district or on a multiple county basis.
29. See, e.g., the account of the impeachment of United States Judge Halsted L.
Bitter, judge for the Southern District of Florida in Cullen, The Last Impeachment,
49 FLA. B. J. 130 (1975). The enigmatic words "high crimes and misdemeanors"
certainly are inadequate guides to judicial ethics.
30. See Holloman, The Judicial Reform Act: History, Analysis, and Comment,
35 LAw AND CoNrTEqp. PROB. 128 (1970) for a discussion of the constitutional prob-
lems with respect to legislation providing for discipline and/or removal of federal
judges.
31. See, e.g., JUDIcIAL.r CODE OF PA. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 3301 et seq. (1976), estab-
lishing a Judicial Inquiry and Review Board with power to order suspension, removal,
July 19781 JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
It is my view that judges have not addressed the problems of
judicial ethics and judicial responsibility because they are over-
whelmed by the torrents of day-to-day litigation, because they are
naturally reluctant to criticize their peers, and, perhaps most impor-
tantly, because they are not threatened by malpractice lawsuits -.3 '
Consumer litigation has forced business and the professions to
adopt higher standards of ethical conduct. A quiet but dramatic
legal revolution has taken place during the past three decades. For
example, the old doctrine of caveat emptor, or let the buyer beware,
has been replaced by a wholly new concept of products liabilityYa
Industry may no longer manufacture unsafe goods and sell them
with impunity. The ultimate consumer now has a right to recover
damages from the manufacturer notwithstanding the presence of
intermediaries in the distributive chain. The law now recognizes
that industry has a duty to society.
A similar expansion in the realm of professional responsibility
and liability has occurred. For centuries it was believed that even
though lawyers were officers of the court, they owed a duty only
to their clients. That is, a lawyer could not be held answerable
in damages to anyone other than the retaining client, even in the
event the lawyer's advice may have adversely affected others. To-
day, it is recognized that lawyers also owe a duty to the public,
discipline, or compulsory retirement of judges. Many state courts have also adopted
rules similar to the Code of Judicial Ethics. See, e.g., PA. RULES OF COURT, CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT; N.Y. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, 29 Judiciary at 517 (Appendix)
(McKinney 1975); CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, 23 Cal. Rules of Court 417,
(Appendix).
32. But see the recent case of Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172 (7th Cir.
1977). The court of appeals reversed a district court decision dismissing an action
against Judge Harold Sturp. Sturp had ordered the sterilization of a fifteen-year-old
girl upon the petition of her mother in an ex parte proceeding. The girl was alleged
to be "somewhat retarded" although she had been attending public school. The lower
court had ruled that the judge was "clothed with absolute judicial immunity." It is
too early to know whether this case is a harbinger of "judicial malpractice suits."
Legislators are also imnmne from liability. See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S.
367 (1951). Since their terms of office are relatively short and their conduct is search-
ingly examined by opposition candidates during election campaigns, legislators have
been moved to adopt more stringent ethical codes for themselves. But see Expeditions
Unlimited Aquatic Enterprises, Inc. v. Smithsonian Institute, 500 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
33. This concept was first enunciated in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A (1967). Without legislative authority, it has been adopted as the law of most
states.
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to people they have never seen and from whom they have never
received a fee. For example, lawyers have a responsibility to pro-
vide investors with accurate information in drafting securities regis-
tration statements for business clients.34  Similarly, auditors and ac-
countants in preparing annual reports are responsible to the public,
not merely to the clients who retain them to perform audits.35  Doc-
tors are increasingly being held responsible not only for their own
errors but also for mistreatment rendered by employees of the hos-
pitals in which they place their patients. Social workers, therapists,
and psychiatrists have been held to owe a legal responsibility to the
families and acquaintances of the persons they treat. A psychiatrist
has been held liable because his mentally disturbed patient killed a
woman. The doctor had reason to know, as a result of what the
patient told him, that the woman was in danger, yet he failed to warn
her.36 Even school teachers, whose contract is with the school dis-
trict, have been sued by students on the ground that they failed ef-
fectively to teach these students.3 7
In all the foregoing cases, the old doctrine of privity of contract,
that A owes a duty only to B with whom he has a contract, has
been abrogated. The judiciary has recognized that others have a
wider responsibility to the public and that broader standards of ethics
and competence are required. The judiciary, without legislative
mandate, has acted as the conscience of the community to protect
the public in a highly specialized, technological, and impersonal so-
ciety in which liability may arise in ways unanticipated by the parties
or the legislature.
It would seem that the judges who have imposed such liability
on others should examine their own role in society as well. Judges
perform a public function; they should owe a duty to society gener-
ally. It is the thesis of this Article that such duty should be defined.
At present judges are guided by five vague mandates: (1) the
oath of office; (2) the Constitution; (3) precedent, that is, what other
courts have decided in similar cases; (4) a personal sense of justice;
and (5) the canons of judicial ethics. The oath of office in some juris-
34. SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
35. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
36. Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d
334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
37. Ianniello v. University of Bridgeport, N.Y. Times, June 29, 1977, at B4, col. 1.
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dictions is as broad and simple as that taken by the President of the
United States: "I do solemnly swear ... that I will faithfully execute
the Office of the President of the United States and will to the best
of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the
United States." 38 In other jurisdictions, oaths may take the form of
degrading promises that the designated judge has not bought the
office. 39  Neither type of oath provides much guidance to the judge.
The Constitution is subject to a wide latitude of interpretation
and frequently offers little guidance. The vast majority of cases
coming before the courts do not turn on constitutional issues nor are
they often governed by clearly defined statutes. Most litigated cases
do not fall within the precise ambit of precedent. Lawyers and
litigants usually act reasonably. They do not litigate unless there
is a fair probability of success. If the law is clear and there is no
likelihood that the courts will change their previous rulings, parties
are inclined to settle their disputes without resort to litigation. Con-
sequently, precedent frequently does not present a clear guide to the
perplexed jurist facing an unusual case or one of first impression.4 0
One's own sense of justice is not only difficult to define but may
generally constitute an impermissible standard. A judge who de-
rives authority solely from the state cannot predicate decisions pri-
marily upon the teachings of a church or even upon concepts claimed
to be immutable or coeval with God. 4' American law has in recent
38. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
39. For example, the oath of office required by the Pennsylvania Constitution
until the Amendment of May 17, 1966, read: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that
I will support, obey and defend the Constitution of the United States, and the Con-
stitution of this Commonwealth, and that I will discharge the duties of my office with
fidelity; that I have not paid or contributed, or promised to pay or contribute, either
directly or indirectly, any money or other valuable thing, to procure my nomination
or election, (or appointment,) except for necessary and proper expenses expressly au-
thorized by law; that I have not knowingly violated any election law of this Common-
wealth, or procured it to be done by others in my behalf; that I will not knowingly
receive, directly or indirectly, any money or other valuable thing for the performance
or non-performance of any act or duty pertaining to my office, other than the compen-
sation allowed by law." PENN. CONST., art. 6, § 3 (1874).
40. See IIAhMONIDES, MosEs BEN IAIMON, THE GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED (1956
ed.).
41. See CICERO, LAWS, bk. II, §§ 4-5. According to Thomas Aquinas, God instructs
man by means of divine law and grace. SUMNIA THEOLOGICA, Part One of the Second
Part, Question 90. Locke defined natural law as "being the decree of the divine will
discernible by the light of nature and indicating what is and what is not in conformity
with rational nature." LOCKE, ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF NATURE. In a secular society
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years rather been dominated by pragmatism and the theory that the
law is whatever the judge says it is. 42  Unless law and judicial con-
structions of it are perceived to be based upon concepts of morality
and fairness, however, there arises no legitimate reason for obedience,
other than the force of threatened penalty.43
As the public vacillates between its own desires and legal com-
pulsion, so does the judiciary. Judges are torn between the mandate
of positive law and sometimes conflicting beliefs in human rights.
Under what circumstances, then, may a judge sworn to uphold the
law violate the letter of it in pursuit of moral values? A negative
response to the foregoing query reduces a judge to an amoral func-
tionary, blindly endorsing crimes against humanity in the name of
duty. An affirmative answer, on the other hand, leads to result-
oriented decisions, perhaps popular at the moment but which time
reveals to be unwarranted and also violative of basic rights as well
as of positive law. Such yielding to popular feelings and social
goals may result in short sighted decision making. Many decisions
which conformed to contemporary feelings and social goals, beliefs
that were also undoubtedly deeply held convictions of the judges and
justices who rendered the decisions, reveal the dangers of relying upon
individual concepts of right. For example, compulsory sterilization of
mental defectives, 44 forcible relocation of Japanese from California,45
compulsory flag salute, 4 indicia of intent as a decisive element in ob-
scenity,47 police misconduct as a ground for exclusion of reliable evi-
dence.48
in which atheists, agnostics, believers in spiritualism, astrology and arcane sects as well
as adherents of all world religions are protected in their rights to believe or disbelieve,
no judge could predicate a decision upon what he or she believed to be the decree of
the divine will.
42. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 460-61 (1897) in
which appears the oft-quoted statement: "But this limit of [legal] power is not co-
extensive with any system of morals . . . . The prophecies of what the courts will
do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law." Note the
changing fashions in American legal doctrine. See GILMORE, THE: AGES OF AMERICAN
LAW (1977). See also "The Ordinary Religion of the Law School," an address by
Roger C. Cramton, Dean of Cornell Law School, delivered at a meeting of Committee
on Law and Religion (CORAL) held at the Harvard Law School on March 5, 1977.
43. See BENTHAM, OF LAws IN GENERAL (1970). See also Knowles, Coercion
and the Law, in PERSPECTIVES IN JURISPRUDENCE (Attwooll ed. 1977).
44. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
45. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
46. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
47. Ginzberg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
48. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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A trial judge is not free to set aside precedent and positive law
except when the failure to do so would result in the violation of
basic human rights that are given constitutional protection. 49  Ab-
sent a constitutional right, a judge can only point to inequities by
way of an opinion and hope that the affected part) will present the
issue, properly framed, to a higher court. In civil cases, the eco-
nomically disadvantaged rarely can afford an appeal. Inevitably,
in such cases, a judge must preside over injustice. 0 The notion of
"fundamental fairness" is primarily limited to procedural questions.
such as the right to a hearing and representation, and does not ex-
tend to substantive doctrine. 51
49. For example, I have refused to charge in the language of the statute and
centuries of case law that the testimony of a rape victim, unlike that of other witnesses,
must be received with caution; I have refused to enforce the statutory death penalty:
I have ruled that all people, including women and children, have a right to bodily
integrity regardless of familial relationships or the claims of medical or psychiatric
practice. These are very rare and exceptional cases.
50. Prior to the recent Supreme Court decision in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67 (1972), reh. denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1973), trial courts could not allow for the un-
equal positions of an impoverished, semi-literate borrower and a sophisticated lender.
Cf. the unequal positions of the academically disadvantaged with the well educated.
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
Innumerable situations arise in routine litigation in which disadvantaged and handi-
capped individuals are held to the standards designed for the average person. See,
e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972), holding
that in determining whether there was informed consent to medical treatment the court
must decide on the basis of the response of a reasonable person, not the actual state
of mind of the plaintiff. Equal application of rules of evidence and substantive law
to all litigants inevitably results in manifest unfairness to individuals whose capacities
are markedly different from the norm. A trial judge cannot alter it. Loss of earnings
is an approved measure of damages that results in high recoveries for those with lucra-
tive positions and scant recovery for those who are unemployed although the needs
of the latter for compensation for injuries may be much greater.
Much jurisprudential doctrine is predicated on the assumption that all people are
reasonable and will act in accordance with what is in the theoretical best interest of
the greatest number of people. See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1972). Other
doctrines are based upon the concept of equal and reciprocal obligations and benefits.
In fact, the relationships between adult and child, ignorant and educated, rich and
poor, male and female are not equal or reciprocal. It is interesting to note that in
1963, Professor Fuller failed to mention the existence of the female and consequently
failed to consider the lack of reciprocity between one half of the population and the
other half. See FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964).
51. See, e.g., Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 (1976); Herring v. N.Y., 422 U.S.
853 (1975); Gagnon v. Sarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970).
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The Canons of Judicial Ethics, adopted in 1924,52 is probably
the most vague and inadequate code ever conjured up. It has been
said that the Canons are as useful to a judge as a valentine to a
heart surgeon. In 1972, a new Code of Judicial Conduct was
adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Associa-
tion.53 Of the Code's seven Canons, substantial changes are evident
only in Canon 5, which regulates extra-judicial activities, and Canon
6, which provides for the filing of reports of compensation for quasi-
judicial and extra-judicial activities. The new provisions present
modest precatory statements rather than clear and enforceable man-
dates.5 4
Canon 2A reads as follows: "A judge should respect and com-
ply with the law and should conduct himself at all times in a manner
that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary."' 5  Such a provision clearly provides little guidance
for the judge in the exercise of judicial duties.
The prohibitions with respect to venality, favoritism, and per-
sonal ambition present little more than common sense rules. They
are as obvious as the Ten Commandments and equally lack self-
effectuation.
One of the serious deficiences in the Canons is the failure to
acknowledge that a judge owes a duty to the community at large,
not merely to the lawyers and litigants who appear before the bench.
For example, the judiciary ought to consider very carefully the di-
lemma that arises when dangers and wrongs are revealed in the course
of litigation that affect persons and institutions who are not parties.
Does a judge have a duty to inform affected persons? On the other
hand, such an action might be viewed as a step outside the bounds
of judicial propriety. The threat of such action by a judge might
deter witnesses from testifying in court and chill the free exercise
52. ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETmcs (1924).
53. ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972).
54. The discussions with respect to the contents and desirability of the new code
of judicial ethics have dealt primarily with judicial abuses-acts of omission or com-
mission about which there is general agreement as to impropriety. The question of
affirmative duties of the judiciary to the public at large has been ignored. See, e.g.,
Kaufman, Lions or Jackals: The Function of a Code of Judicial Ethics, 35 LAW AND
CoNTEMP. PRoB. 3 (1970); McKay, The Judiciary and Nonjudicial Activities, 35 LAW
AND CONTEMP. PROB. 9 (1970); Clark, Judicial Self-Regulation - Its Potential, 35 LAW
AND CONTEMP. PROB. 37 (1970).
55. ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETmcs No. 2A.
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of legal rights. If the judge does not act, the evils revealed may
continue unchecked.
Ethical problems arise most frequently not in landmark cases
but rather during the course of routine litigation. For example, the
evidence in a negligence case might reveal that the hospital in which
the plaintiff was operated on was unsanitary and did not meet mini-
mum state standards. Does the judge have a right or a duty to
notify the State Board of Hospital Licensure of these conditions?
If, in a law suit involving directors of a corporation, it is revealed
that corporate assets have been misused by several directors to the
detriment of the public shareholders, does the judge have a right
or a duty to inform the stockholders that they have been cheated
when the parties subsequently settle the suit in order to avoid the
recitation of these findings? Would providing such information con-
stitute officious intermeddling in litigation? Police abuse, miscon-
duct by probation officers and other public officials, as well as con-
ditions that constitute a physical hazard to the public, are frequently
revealed in the course of litigation. Does a judge have the right
or the duty to call this information to the attention of appropriate
public authorities?
Every judge encounters many cases in which personal injury
litigants have been permanently crippled as a result of medical mal-
practice. Similarly, every trial judge confronts cases in which un-
necessary operations have been performed. Should the judge notify
the medical society and the Board of Licensure of these observations?
In architectural and legal malpractice cases, gross incompetence is
occasionally revealed. Unless the judge notifies the licensure or dis-
ciplinary board, the public may be subject to the continuing dangers
that result from having incompetents practicing a profession.
The problem of incompetence of legal counsel is particularly
serious. 56  Every judge sees plaintiffs who have a very high probabil-
ity of recovery fail to recover because of incompetent counsel. Judges
56. Note the admission rules for the district courts approved in principle by The
Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit requiring lawyers to have taken courses in
evidence, civil procedure, criminal law and procedure, professional responsibility and
trial advocacy. The committee found that there is a "lack of competency in trial advo-
cacy in the federal courts." New Admission Rules Proposed for Federal District Courts,
61 A.B.A.J. 945 (1975). It is generally acknowledged that the level of trial practice
in the federal courts is superior to that in most state courts. There is at present, how-
ever, no means by which clearly incompetent lawyers can be removed.
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also see large and unwarranted verdicts returned against defendants
as a result of the incompetence of their attorneys. Cases are often
settled in a manner clearly unfair to one of the parties. Does the
judge have a right or a duty to intercede when counsel wants to settle?
Neither the bar nor the judiciary has addressed the foregoing problems.
In the realm of criminal law, a convicted defendant is entitled
to a new hearing (a post conviction hearing) if he can show that
he was afforded an inadequate defense by incompetent counsel.;-
No comparable right exists for civil litigants. They must bring a
separate suit against their counsel and then prove, first, that they
should have won and second, that the adverse result was caused by
the incompetence of counsel.
Canon 4 recognizes a limited right of the judiciary to engage
in activities to improve the law, the legal system, and the adminis-
tration of justice. The Canons are, however, significantly silent with
respect to the right or duty of a judge to advise with respect to non-
legislative matters.
The Canons of Ethics and most courses on professional respon-
sibility deal with overt misconduct, primarily concerning financial
involvements of lawyers and judges, conduct that any lay person
would recognize as unethical. Recent literature on judicial ethics
discusses well-known abuses: extra-judicial compensation, 8 remov-
al of grossly incompetent and corrupt judges,5' disqualification of
judges for interest in litigation. ° There has been little written that
examines the more difficult problems of judicial sensitivity, fitness,
and misuses of office for personal aggrandizement that does not in-
volve the taking of money. No one discusses affirmative duties.
57. See Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970); Bines, Remedying
Ineffective Representation in Criminal Cases: Departures from Habeas Corpus, 59 VA.
L. REv. 927 (1973); Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel for the Indigent Defendant,
78 HARv. L. REv. 1434 (1965).
58. See ABA SPECIAL COMM'N ON JUDICIAL ETHICS: PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
AND INTERIM REPORT (1970). See also REDLICH, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, A
PROBLEM APPROACH (1976). Significantly, the only problems with respect to judges
that Professor Redlich considers are old questions resolved many times. The answers
are obvious. The difficult problems that trouble sitting judges are not even suggested.
59. See Holloman, The Judicial Reform Act: History, Analysis and Comment, 35
LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 128 (1970).
60. See Judicial Disqualification Act of 1970 (Bayh Act), 28 U.S.C. § 144; Frank,
Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L. J. 605 (1947). Neither the act nor most of the
commentators consider other and more subtle types of bias and prejudice. See Forer,
Psychiatric Evidence in the Recusation of judges, 73 HAuv. L. REv. 1325 (1961).
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A short but unsatisfactory and simplistic answer to these compli-
cated questions of judicial ethics is the appointment of better judges.
For more than thirty-five years the organized bar and the legislature
in the various states have been considering the so-called Missouri
plan and similar methods of judicial selection. In essence, such
plans provide for the appointment of judges by the governor from
a panel of approved candidates followed by a nonpartisan election in
which the public votes yes or no on the retention of the appointed
judge. The legal profession has been chronically bemused by the
mechanics of judicial selection at the same time it has ignored the
problems of judicial qualifications, ethics, and responsibility.s In
many jurisdictions, appointment and election to the bench are purely
partisan political decisions. The Carter administration has conceded
that federal district judges shall be appointed on a political basis, al-
though federal appellate judges shall be appointed from an approved
list of nominees.62  Screening by "blue ribbon panels" has not proved
generally effective. Such panels have approved nominees who have
been convicted of crimes, who have been suspended from practice of
law because of improper conduct, who have never graduated from law
school, who have graduated from unaccredited law schools and whose
practice and legal experience have been minimal, as well as indi-
viduals whose personal lives have been marked by public intemper-
ance and whose business and financial dealings have been marked
by unethical and illegal practices.
The press, although frequently critical of the judiciary, seldom
examines the records of active judges. Such easily ascertainable
facts as the number of times the judge has been reversed for errors
of law, the number of retrials that have been occasioned by judicial
intemperance and blatant unfairness, the number of judicial appoint-
ments to favored friends, and the outside income that may affect
judicial decisions are rarely revealed.. 3  Unless a judge is being con-
sidered for appointment to the United States Supreme Court. the
record is not closely scrutinized.64
61. In the last six years the Index to Legal Periodicals lists sixty-four articles on
judicial selection and removal but only fourteen on judicial ethics. None of these
articles addresses the problem of judicial responsibility to the public.
62. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1977, at p. A28, col. 1.
63. Canon 6 suggests disclosure of extra judicial compensation but is silent with
respect to financial holdings.
64. The prestigious American Bar Association approved G. Harrold Carswell and
Clement Haynesworth for appointment to the federal bench. It was not until they were
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Instead of relying heavily on the mechanics of judicial selection,
I suggest that certain conditions be imposed upon the judiciary which
will deter those who might misuse the office and encourage those
who have no ulterior motives or extra-judicial aspirations. Judicial
office should be viewed not simply as a job or position but as a vo-
cation. A judge who is entrusted with powers over the liberty and
property of people, whose decisions may disrupt families, separate
children and parents, and make the difference between poverty and
comfort, should view this authority as a solemn trust.
Certain obvious limitations and conditions could be imposed on
the judiciary that would tend to discourage those who do not view
judicial office as a vocation but rather as an occupation, a stepping
stone to further advancement. Such conditions might include: an-
nual disclosure of extra-judicial income and activities as well as finan-
cial holdings; permanent disqualification from nonjudicial appointive
or elective offices; a cutoff period between leaving the bench and
joining a law firm or corporation which has been in litigation before
the judge who resigns or retires;65 and a minimum age requirement
for judicial office.
A minimum age for the judiciary may appear to be a startling
suggestion, but it is not made lightly. Beginning with the Kennedy
administration, a premium apparently has been placed on the appoint-
ment of young officials, almost as if youth in and of itself were a
particular qualification. While the energy and new ideas of young
people are desirable in many activities, youth also has its hazards.
Hugh Sloan, Jr., one of the young men involved in the Watergate
scandal, warned against placing too great a reliance on bright, eager
young people. "Looking back on it, I would have to say youth for
youth's sake isn't that good an idea. You had a staff that got over-
zealous and got carried away .... 6-,
nominated to the United States Supreme Court that an independent investigation was
undertaken by outsiders. Both men were subsequently rejected by the U.S. Senate.
See Grossman & Wasby, Haynesworth and Parker: History Does Live Again, 23 S.C.L.
REv. 345 (1971).
65. Restrictions established by President Carter for federal executive officers and
employees include restrictions on private employment after leaving government. The
President's Message to the Congress Urging Enactment of the Proposed Ethics in
Government Act of 1977 and Special Prosecutor Legislation, 13 PRESmENTL, Docu-
MENTS JimY CAInTsR No. 19, at 647 (1977).
66. N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1977, at 76, col. 5.
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Judgeships are offices peculiarly unsuited for eager zealots, no
matter how bright they are. It requires a long view, an apprecia-
tion that the burning conviction of today may tomorrow be viewed
as arrogant and repressive. Basic human rights and needs cannot
be tempered by radical chic or reactionary dogma.
The bench is a passive and reflective position far removed from
the active advocacy engaged in by lawyers. Successful, competent
lawyers who become judges generally experience some difficulty in
adjusting from a life of active involvement and advocacy to the some-
what cloistered and passive judicial role. Lawyers are accustomed
to taking a strong and forceful stand on behalf of their clients, to
advocating changes in the law, and to engaging actively in political,
civic, and charitable affairs. Most of these activities are inappropri-
ate for participation by the judiciary. No one unwilling to forego
for the rest of one's professional life such dynamic participation should
seek or accept a position on the bench. For a person under the age
of fifty, such a choice is difficult to make and practically impossible
to adhere toY7
Two hundred years ago, when the Constitution established 35
as the minimum age for the President, the average life expectancy
was 35.5 years. Today, the average life expectancy of the American
male is 68.5 years and for the American female 76.4 years. The
public recognizes that in many cases sixty-five is too early an age for
retirement. Federal judicial retirement is now mandatory at seventy
years of age. Appointment or election at age fifty would permit a
judge to serve actively for twenty years. A judge serving longer than
twenty years may become a roadblock to progress.
Although law is by its nature a conservative force in society.
if a judge is on the bench too many years, he or she is deciding the
questions of the day on the basis of experience and education that
came thirty to fifty years before. Thus, added to the natural cultural
lag of the law, there is the additional period of the judge's years on
the bench, which may result in decisions that are two generations
out of date.
67. But see the recent appointment of Rose Bird, age 40, to the California Supreme
Court. She was graduated from law school in 1965. N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1977, at
48, col. 1. Ms. Bird could serve thirty years on the court.
[Vol. 29
JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY
Conclusion
In the last half century since the Canons of Judicial Ethics were
adopted the population of the United States has more than doubled.
The amount of litigation has increased enormously and disproportion-
ately. Our society and our laws have undergone extraordinary
changes. The rights of women, children, the aged, minorities, the
mentally handicapped, and prisoners have undergone tremendous de-
velopment in the past fifty years. No aspect of law has remained
static for this half century except judicial ethics.'s
During this period, the judiciary has imposed new and more
rigorous standards of fair dealing and responsibility upon profession-
als, industry, and ordinary citizens.6  Should not these concepts also
apply to the judiciary?
There should be a covenant or compact between the judge and
society. At present judgeships are invested with trappings and cere-
monies. Robes of office surround the bench and the law with almost
sacramental authority. But, if judges do not act with the morality
and dedication required, they shall soon become black-robed priests
presiding over a dying secular religion.
One who accepts a position on the bench should do so knowing
that it is a hard, demanding job that has few of the satisfactions of
legal practice. The bench is not financially lucrative and the satis-
factions of wealth are missing. The thrill of winning is gone. The
judge never wins but, rather, is often severely criticized in the press,
subjected to barrages of hostile literature, picketing and malicious
accusations by persons who disagree with a particular decision. The
satisfactions of public approval and acclaim are seldom the rewards
of a good judge. A judge must gain satisfaction through dedication
to the administration of justice.
Ethics has been defined as the principle of what "ought to be."
If law is to be credible, it must be consonant with human rights
and morality. The judiciary must, therefore, be concerned with
what law ought to be and what the duties of a judge ought to be.
68. The Code does not substantially alter the Canons, nor does it include the public
obligations and the personal restrictions herein proposed.
69. For example, anger invites rescue was first enunciated in 1921. Wagner v.
International Ry. Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437, 191 N.Y.S. 64 (1921).
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This concern with ethics and morality implies neither sectarianism
nor theological belief. It does require a sense of vocation, a calling
to do justice based on humanism and individual conscience entirely
compatible with a pluralistic, secular state.
The courts are the ultimate guardians of the rights of all Amer-
icans. Two millenia ago, Juvenal asked "Quis custodiet ipsos cus-
todes?" to which there has as yet been no satisfactory answer. Judges
who are the guardians can no longer hide behind their robes of office.
They must apply to themselves at least the same standards which
they have imposed on others. It is time to acknowledge judicial ac-
countability and responsibility to the public.
